Yakov Drabovskiy v. United States Department of Ho by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-30-2015 
Yakov Drabovskiy v. United States Department of Ho 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Yakov Drabovskiy v. United States Department of Ho" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1234. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1234 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-1267 
___________ 
 
YAKOV G. DRABOVSKIY, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
USA, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-00451) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 23, 2015 
Before:  JORDAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 30, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 While serving his sentence for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(B) (willful failure 
to depart after having been ordered removed), see United States v. Drabovskiy, W.D. La. 
Crim. No. 2:09-cr-00146, Yakov G. Drabovskiy filed an action titled “civil action for 
deprivation of liberty due to indefinite detention.”  He primarily complained about an 
“indefinite detention” relating to his order of removal, immigration detention, and a 
detainer lodged by the Department of Homeland Security.  The District Court concluded 
that the claims were not actionable because Drabovskiy was not in immigration custody 
at that time and claims relating to his past immigration custody were moot.  We affirmed 
the ruling.  Drabovskiy v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 573 F. App’x 93, 94 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam). 
    A few months after our mandate issued, Drabovskiy returned to the District Court 
with a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  He asked the 
District Court to consider his “civil action for deprivation of liberty due to indefinite 
detention” on the merits, noting that he was approaching the end of his criminal sentence 
and asserting that the “danger of indefinite (continuous) detention [was] imminent.”  On 
December 16, 2014, the District Court, noting the ruling affirming the dismissal of the 
action, denied the Rule 60(b) motion. 
 On December 31, 2014, the District Court received Drabovskiy’s motion for 
reconsideration of the December 16, 2014 order.  Drabovskiy essentially argued that our 
mandate did not preclude relief under Rule 60(b) because he had presented a basis for 
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relief to the District Court that had not been before us.  He also emphasized the 
importance of deciding cases on their merits.  On January 8, 2015, the District Court 
denied the motion, noting that it had properly denied the Rule 60(b) motion because 
Drabovskiy had not raised any matters that were not included or includable in his appeal.  
In ruling, the District Court also disallowed additional filings in the case without leave of 
the court.  Drabovskiy filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 2015, at the latest.1 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2  Our review of an order 
denying a motion for reconsideration is for abuse of discretion, but, to the extent the 
denial is based on the interpretation and application of a legal precept, our review is 
plenary.  See Koshatka v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  
Also, generally, our review of orders denying Rule 60(b) motions is for abuse of 
discretion.3  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) 
                                              
1 With his appeal he presents several motions, namely, two motions to expedite this 
matter, two motions for bail pending appeal (and a similar request for release in his reply 
brief), a motion to file a constitutional claim (he submits a “constitutional claim to 
declare the immigration law unconstitutional in respect to permanent residents and lawful 
immigrants”), a motion to supplement the record, and a motion to strike the Appellee’s 
brief.     
 
2 Drabovskiy’s appeal is timely as to both challenged orders.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1)(B). 
 
3 Additionally, we ordinarily consider whether a district court followed the proper 
procedures for imposing a filing injunction like the one the District Court entered, see In 
re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982), and we review the imposition of such an 
injunction for abuse of discretion, see Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 
1987).  However, Drabovskiy does not challenge the filing injunction, so we consider the 
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(explaining also that this Court exercises plenary review over orders granting or denying 
relief under Rule 60(b)(4)).  
 The District Court did not err in denying the motion for reconsideration.  “The 
purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to 
present newly discovered evidence.”  Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d 
Cir. 1985).  Although Drabovskiy argued that the District Court had made an error of 
law, the District Court had not erred in rejecting his Rule 60(b) motion.  “[A] district 
court is without jurisdiction to alter the mandate of this court on the basis of matters 
included or includable in [a] prior appeal.”  Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 679 F.2d 
336, 337 (3d Cir. 1982).  That Drabovskiy’s federal sentence would, at some point, end 
was a matter understood in his earlier appeal.  Although he changed his characterization 
of the matter that was included (or to the extent it was not included, includable) in his 
appeal, Drabovskiy did not seek relief based on something that this Court had not 
considered. 
   Accordingly, the District Court properly concluded that reconsideration was not 
warranted in the absence of a legal error.  See also Seese, 679 F.2d at 337 n.1 (comparing 
the circumstances in which a District Court should entertain a Rule 60(b) motion under 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976) (per curiam), with those in which a 
                                                                                                                                                  
issues related to it waived.  See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 192 
(3d Cir. 2005). 
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District Court should not).  For the reasons given, the District Court properly rejected the 
Rule 60(b) motion. 
 In short, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.  We deny Drabovskiy’s 
pending motions.  
 
